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CASE NOTES
CALIFORNIA TAKES ANOTHER COOKIE FROM THE
POLICY JAR: A HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
ALEXANDER LOUDEN*
Water agencies are operating under a set of preferences, policies, and guidelines that occurred when water was very plentiful. However, it is time to really
look at the reality water agencies face right now. California's water law system
is an international disgrace.'
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I. ITRODUCTION
California has one of the most unique water law systems in the country,
recognizing both riparian rights and appropriation permits. The state government holds the state's water in trust, and all appropriations of water must
comply with various, sometimes competing, constitutional and statutory policies. Additionally, state agencies rate water uses by how beneficial they are to
society, favoring appropriations for higher rated uses. In 1978, California rec-

ognized the importance of providing a stable yet adaptable framework to ac-

* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author extends
his utmost gratitude to Johna Varty and Chris Butler for their dedication and patience editing
this Note.
1. Assembly Floor Session: Readig of A.B. 685 State Water Policy, Reg. Sess. 2011-12
(statement of Mike Eng) aailable at http://calchannel.granicus.coni/MediaPlayer.phpview
id=7&clipid=719 (begins at 00:30:25).
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commodate growing demand for a limited supply of water.' California certainly
operates a system that emphasizes practical considerations over theoretical
simplicity.' Recently, however, serious problems with the quality and expense
of drinking water have highlighted some of California's water struggles.
In 2010, a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly found 884
million people around the world lacked access to safe drinking water' and encouraged an annual update by an independent expert t9 report on the status of
various countries' implementation of safe drinking water efforts.' In August
2011, the United Nations published Catarina Albuquerque's expert report,
which included an investigation of California's system. Although the report
never calls California a "disgrace," as Assembly member Mike Eng construed
it, the report did delve into the inadequacies of many California communities'
drinking water supplies.' For example, in the city of Seville, California, nitrate
levels are so high in drinking water-and the community so poor-that households spend on average twenty percent of their income every year to purchase
safe water, or else risk poisoning themselves.' The international spotlight
spurred California to adopt a policy recognizing a human right to water into
the state's existing legal framework.' Section 106.3 of the California Water
Code ("Human Right to Water") directs state agencies to consider the hardships many communities face trying to obtain safe and affordable drinking
water.'
The history of California water law illuminates the legal issues and adaptations leading to the enactment of the Human Right to Water statute where this
new policy fits in the state's legal framework. To that end, section II of this
Note provides an overview of the unique history that shaped California's water
law since statehood. In section III, this Note generally evaluates potential
changes California may see as state agencies apply the Human Right to Water.
In section IV, this Note specifically addresses groundwater integration concerns. Finally, section V concludes with a summary of the Note.

2. GOvERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS, FINAL REPORT,
1-2, 6-7, 9 (1978) (describing California's historical, contemporary, and potential future adaptations of water law) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
3. Id.at 7.
4. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/64/292, 2 (Aug. 3 2010).
5. Id. at 3.
6.
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE HUMAN RIGHT TO SAFE DRINKING WATER AND
SANITATION, 1 34-39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/33/Add.4 (Aug. 2, 2011) [hereinafter SPECIAL

REPORTI (by Catarina de Albuquerque).
7. Id. at 16.
8. Assembly FloorSession: Reading of A.B. 685 State Water Polcy, Reg. Sess. 2011-12
(statement of Mike Eng) aailable at http://calchannel.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view
_id-7&clipjd-719 (begins at 00:30:25).
9. CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3 (West 2012).
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II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WATER LAW IN
CALIFORNIA
A.

PRE-1928 WATER RIGHTS

Water law in California is notoriously c6mplex, but the system gains clarity
when placed into historical context." California initially adopted a traditional
riparian water rights system, common in much of the eastern United States
and England." Under this early model, property owners had the right to use
water appurtenant to their land, regardless of the use to which the riparian
owner put the water." Riparian owners cannot sever their water rights from
their land."
Two forces at play during California's infancy highlighted the riparian
framework's insufficiency for California. First, frontier settlement and the riparian doctrine are most compatible in places like the eastern United States
and England, where land bordering water supplies is in abundance. However,
water is scarce in California. With a shortage of land adjacent to water supplies, settlers had to modify traditional property rights to allow diversion of
water from land they did not own." Second, during the early stages of California's gold rush and subsequent settlement the federal government owned
much of the land upon which the miners were prospecting (and incidentally
trespassing)." Miners needed water to wash ore but were not landowners and,
thus, had no claim to water under the riparian doctrine. To solve this problem, the miners disregarded the riparian model and instead created an informal system to allocate the scarce resource efficiently and predictably." The
miner's system differed from the riparian doctrine in that it was not based on
ownership of land, and instead granted the first person to divert water for beneficial use a priority right to continued use over later "junior" users." California
developed a legal framework surrounding such appropriations that defined
when a use was beneficial-and thus valid against junior appropriators." What
emerged in the American West was the first iteration of the prior appropriation doctrine, memorably termed "first in time, first in right.""
Although prior appropriation began as an informal custom among miners
trespassing on federal land, in 1855 California's Supreme Court held such
appropriations created a valid and enforceable water right." In the next decade, Congress also recognized the custom as valid and declared non10. Roderick E. Walston, Calornia Water Law HIstorical Orins to the Present, 29
WHrrrIER L. REv. 765, 766 (2008).
11. Idat 768; SPECIAL REPORT, supm note 6.
12. Walston, supra note 10, at 768.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-8.
Walston, supra note 10, at 768.
Id.
Discussed Infra Section B.
Walston, supra note 10, at. 768.
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855); see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
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appropriated water available for appropriation." Under the prior appropriation
doctrine, property ownership was not necessary; rather, water users could obtain the right to use a specific quantity of surface water by diverting water in
priority." Unlike riparian uses, if the state deemed an appropriation use nonbeneficial, or if the use ceased, the appropriator lost their right to use the water."
California water law is unique. Most states chose to adopt either a riparian
or prior appropriation scheme to suit the water needs of the state without the
inherent tension and complexity of a dual rights system.' But California is not
like most states. In 1884, the Supreme Court of California held in Lux v. Haggzn that riparian rights coexisted with appropriated rights." For a time, riparian
rights were superior to appropriative rights in that riparian owners were entitled to full use of the water flowing appurtenant to their land without regard to
the effect on appropriation rights." In other words, the "California Doctrine,"
as lawyers and judges called the dual rights system, allowed riparian owners to
use as much water as needed to fully satisfy even an unreasonable use before a
prior appropriator could exercise a quantified right to the same surface water."
As such, riparian rights subjected appropriative rights to uncertainty and sporadic unfulfillment, despite their importance to growing statewide development
efforts."
In 1926, California's Supreme Court highlighted the inequitable consequences of operating two systems of water rights allocation in tendem." The
case, Herminghaus v. Southern Cahfornia Edison Company,fueled industrial,
agricultural, and municipal disfavor of riparian-appropriation interaction.
Herminghaus was a farmer who wanted to use the entire flow of a stream to
flood irrigate his fields." The resulting lack of water thwarted an upstream
power development plan." Because Herminghaus did not need to justify a
riparian use against an appropriation use, the court held that the massive diversion was within Herminghaus' right as a riparian landowner."
The superiority the court in Herninghausgave to riparian owners directly
contradicted the development forces that pushed California to adopt the prior
appropriations model in the first place. Since the mining rush in the mid-19th
21. Walston, supranote 10, at 779.
22. Id. at 769.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919, 924 (Cal. 1884).
26. Walston, supra note 10 at 770 (citing Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607
(Cal. 1926)).
27. Id.; Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties & Persons, 306 P.2d 824, 838 (Cal. 1957) revd sub
nom Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) (noting that under the Heringhaus
decision, "no matter how unreasonable the claim of a riparian owner to the full flow of a stream
might be, he had the right to assert it.").
28. Ivanhoe, 306 P.2d at 838.
29. Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1926) overrled by CAL CONsT.
art. X, § 2; Walston, supra note 10, at 770.
30.

Herminghaus,252 P. at 609.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. at 612; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
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century, California's rich soil and booming population meant farmers, power
plants, and municipal water suppliers needed water rights upon which they
could rely to continue nurturing businesses and communities into the future.'
As such, the 1926 Herminghauscase catalyzed a strong reaction from Californians trying to protect mining and agricultural interests at the heart of the
state's economy.'
B. POST-1928 1VATER RIGHTS

In 1928, California fortified appropriative rights with a constitutional
amendment. ' Article X, section 2 not only expressly rejected riparian "superiority," but also created the foundation of California's modern water law system
through three policy provisions. ' As such, the "amendment does more than
merely overturn Herminghaus-itestablishes state water policy."" It prohibited
waste and limited valid water uses-both riparian and appropriative-to only
maximally beneficial uses." It also set a new "lodestar"" for the government to
weigh competing uses: the use must conserve water "with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use ... for the public welfare."" Because the constitution
thus required all water use to achieve maximum benefit and minimum waste
in furtherance of the public interest, the California Supreme Court interpreted
the amendment as requiring state agencies to weigh "reasonable and beneficial" use between afl competing water rights, even riparian rights." The state
legislature then further defined the boundaries of the constitutional mandate
through comprehensive legislation.
Section 1257 of the California Water Code codifies the "beneficial uses"
prerogative of the amendment." Beneficial uses include, but are not limited to,
"domestic, irrigation, municipal, and industrial uses, preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife, recreational, mining and power purposes, and
any uses specified to be protected in any relevant water quality control plan.""
Furthermore, historical determinations do not limit beneficial use because it is
a concept "flexible enough to encompass changing public needs."" Other provisions of the Water Code grant the State Water Resources Control Board
("SWRCB") the authority to carry out the prescribed system of weighing beneficial uses to determine water rights, outlined below in Section c."

33. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.; Walston, supra note 10, at 770.
37. Nat Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 725 (Cal. 1983).
38. CAL. CONST. art. X, S 2.
39. Walston, supra note 10, at 769.
40. Walston, supra note 10, at 770.
41. NatY Audubon Soc), 658 P.2d at 719; FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9; see also 12
Witkin, Summary 10th (2005) Real Prop, § 920, p. 1110.
42. CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 2012).
43. Id; see id. § 659 (West 2013).
44. NatYAudubon Soc'658 P.2d at 719, discussed Ina Section D.
45. CAL. WATER CODE SS 100-540, 1000-5976 (West 2012).
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C.STATUTORY PRIORITIES OF WATER USE

Since 1913, California statutes have outlined the duties of the SWRCB regarding water rights appropriations along with administrative policies and procedures.' In addition to defining beneficial uses, the California State Legislature ("Legislature") provides agencies with guidance for prioritizing appropriations. To that end, statutes mandate that state agencies like the SWRCB lend
more weight to certain beneficial uses than others. Section 106 of the California Water Code ("section 106") states that domestic uses of water are the most
beneficial uses (i.e., most weighty), followed by irrigation uses. Courts interpret domestic uses to include uses necessary for sustenance of human beings,
culinary purposes, and other household purposes." Courts have held the policy in section 106 binding on every California agency, water district, and city."
However, courts have noted section 106 does not identify how much
weight, relative to other competing and complementary policies, the state
should give section 106.' In other words, section 106 requires state agencies to
acknowledge domestic uses are more important than other uses, but it does
not require state agencies to categorically grant or deny permits based upon a
finding of domestic use." In fact, section 107 of the California Water Code
confirms the legislative intent that allpolicies in the Water Code be given their
"full force and effect."" Further, section 1257 explicitly directs the SWRCB to
consider the relative benefits of all proposed beneficial uses in the permit application process, and authorizes the SWRCB to attach whatever conditions
the SWRCB sees fit to "best develop, conserve, and utilize [water] in the public interest."" Thus, although the statutory priority of a particular use is an important consideration for agencies, it does not determine how much water an

46. Walston, supra note 10, at 771.
47. CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 2012).
48. Deetz v. Carter, 43 Cal. Rptr. 321, 324 (1965) (holding that a diversion supplying a flow
of water in excess of domestic needs could also be used for irrigation purposes without violating
the priority scheme when a lesser flow would stagnate and become unfit for domestic use). But
see Cowell v. Armstrong, 290 P. 1036, 1039 (Cal. 1930) (holding that the domestic use priority
does not apply to water needed to care for livestock when the livestock was raised to sell in the
market); Prather v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405, 413 (Cal. 1944) ("it may well be that the commercial
character of the proprietor's business in serving his guests may be so extensive that a lower riparian whose domestic use, whether or not commercialized, would be prejudiced by the business
activities of the upper riparian and to such an extent as to require the interposition of a court of
equity to safeguard his rights. The would especially be true where swimming pools, ornamental
pools, boating, and the like are furnished as a part of the service to the guests, which uses, in
themselves, have been held to be not domestic.") (citations omitted).
49. City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irrigation District, 405 P.2d 377, 381 (Cal. 1965) (noting that although a city may condemn property already appropriated to a public use if the city
seeks to apply the property to a more beneficial use, it can only do so if the appropriated property is currently "used for the public purposes for which it has been so appropriated.").
50. Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 28 Cal. Rptr. 724, 737 (1963).
51. Id.
52. CAL. WATER CODE S 107 (West 2012).
53. CAL. WATER CODE S 1257 (West 2012).
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appropriator may use; agencies must further all policies relevant to their decisions."
D.THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Generally speaking, the public trust doctrine means that "a state must hold
tide to submerged lands in its navigable waters in trust for public benefit."
One commenter provided a concise summary of California's original public
trust doctrine:
Under the equal footing doctrine', California enjoyed the same rights as the
original thirteen states upon its admission to the Union in 1850. Accordingly,
California acquired title to federally defined "navigable waters" below the
high water mark within its borders, subject only to federal interests in maintaining navigation and regulating interstate commerce. Moreover, once federal law confers title to the beds and banks of navigable waters on a state, that
state may redefine property rights between its citizens and itself in relation to
those submerged lands."

Federal navigability definitions thus determine whether a state owns a particular body of water and the land beneath and, therefore, whether the state's
public trust doctrine applies. But, importantly, state courts determine the "contours" of that state's public trust doctrine.' The California Supreme Court has
certainly redefined the public trust doctrine in a recent jurisprudential trend."
llmois Central Railroad v. II2ois, the United States Supreme Court's
seminal public trust case, held that Illinois' public trust doctrine prohibited the

state from granting a private entity ownership of land beneath a navigable body
of water because the transfer would prevent public access to "navigation,
commerce, and fishing."' California adopted Illinois' public trust framework
54. Walston, supranote 10, at 772.
55. Jordan Browning, Unearthng Subterranean Water Rights: The Envronmental Law
Foundationk Efforts to Extend Cahforiak Pubhc Trust Doctrne, ENVIRONs ENvTL. L. &
POL'YJ. 231, 233 (Spring 2011). [hereinafter Browmg.
56. Id. A recent Supreme Court opinion explained the equal footing doctrine:
The title consequences of the equal-footing doctrine can be stated in summary form:
Upon statehood, the State gains title within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable. ... It may allocate and govern those lands according to state law subject only to
"the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of
navigation in interstate and foreign commerce;" [tihe United States retains any title
vested in it before statehood to any land beneath waters not then navigable (and not
tidally influenced), to be transferred or licensed if and as it chooses.
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227-28 (2012) (citations omitted).
57. Browning, supra note 55, at 234 (citations omitted).
58. PPL Mont, 132 S. Ct. at 1235 ("[tihe States retain residual power to determine the
scope of the public trust over waters within their borders, while federal law determines riverbed
title under the equal-footing doctrine.").
59. Stephen H. Leonhardt & Jessica J. Spuhler, The Public Trust Doctrine: What It Is,
Where It Came from, and Why ColoradoDoes Not (andShould Not) Have One, 16 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 47, 53 [hereinafter Leonhardil.
60. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); see Browning, supra note 55, at
234.
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in 1897." Since then, however, state judicial opinions have expanded the scope
of what the state holds in trust and what the trust protects.
The most influential California case describing the public trust doctrine's
application to the doctrine of prior appropriation was also the first case to do
so." In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,Los Angeles acquired
riparian rights appurtenant to Mono Lake as well as permits from the SWRCB
to several streams that fed the lake." Los Angeles diverted those streams to
augment its municipal supplies as the city grew." As a result, the lake shrunk
rapidly, and environmental groups sued the SWRCB claiming the SWRCB
unlawfully permitted Los Angeles to destroy the shrimp ecosystem and the
aesthetic appeal of the scenic lake." The Audubon court acknowledged the
SWRCB's finding that the city's desired domestic use would ordinarily qualify
as adequate justification for its dismissal of protests." However, while the public trust traditionally protected navigation, commerce, and fishing, the court
held the doctrine may also protect "scientific study, recreation, and ... open
space and habitat for birds and marine life."" Furthermore, the Audubon
court found the doctrine protected not just navigable bodies of water like
Mono Lake, but also non-navigable streams that feed navigable bodies of water." It is unclear whether California's application of the public trust doctrine
to non-navigable streams comports with current constitutional interpretations
of the equal footing doctrine."
Because the public trust protected Mono Lake and its feeder streams, and
the city's diversions would harm the lake, the court remanded the case, requiring the SWRCB to consider public trust interests when reviewing permit applications." The impact of Audubon is that, out of "current and historical necessity" the SWRCB must constantly seek to balance appropriation interests
against contemporary, changing public trust interests." Courts have refined this
balancing approach to require the state to protect public trust resources if the

61. Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 50 P. 268 (Cal. 1897).
62. Nat' Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). See also City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the public trust doctrine
applied to land ostensibly conveyed free of the public trust so long as the property could still
serve a public trust use); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the public
trust doctrine applied to any patent of tidelands).
63. NatlAudubon Soc)', 658 P.2d at 713.
64. Id.
65. Id. (finding that the lake's surface dropped over one foot per year).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 719; Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 114 Cal. App. 4th 689,
709 (2003).
68. Nat Audubon Socy 658 P.2d at 720. See Leonhardt, supra note 59, at 72-75 (noting
the public trust had seemingly "leaped beyond its traditional restraint ... to cover rights not only
in navigable waters, but also in waters tributary to navigable waters."). But see Golden Feather
Community Assn. v. Thermalito Irr. Dist. 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 1283 (1989) (holding that the
public trust doctrine did not extend to authorized diversions of non-navigable waters).
69. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. CL 1215,1227-28 (2012).
70. NatYAudubon Socy 658 P.2d at 726.
71. Id at 727-28.
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SWRCB determines it is "feasible."" In other words, regardless of the
SWRCB's past findings, if it determines at any point that it can feasibly correct
an imbalance between the benefits of a public trust use and an appropriation
use, the SWRCB may revoke a prior appropriator's permit in order to further
a state-defined public interest."
E. GROUNDWATER
California's regulatory scheme distinguishes among surface water, percolating groundwater, and subterranean streams." The public trust doctrine only
applies to surface water and subterranean streams-not groundwater.1 Subterranean streams are underground water "flowing through known and definite
channels."" State agencies, principally the SWRCB, regulate surface water and
subterranean streams through the permitting system." All other underground
water is percolating groundwater." Commentators frequently note that this
classification system does not take into account groundwater's substantial, yet
indirect, relationship to surface water." Indeed, all water sources on Earth influence each other through complex hydrological interactions. The reason that
California's legal definitions of water sources does not more clearly mirror
scientific understanding and terminology is likely because legislators sought to
use terms of art already employed in water jurisprudence to avoid constitutional issues while closing a loophole exempting pumping water from a stream
where it flowed temporarily underground from permitting requirements."
72. State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
73. Id. See also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 368-72 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the public trust doctrine applied to land ostensibly conveyed free of the public trust so
long as the property could still serve a public trust use).
74. Jan Stevens, Cahfomia's Groundwater:A Legally Neglected Resource, 19 HASTINGS
W.-N.W.J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 3, 7 (2013).
75. Ieonhardt, supra note 68 at 75-76 . . . California's public trust doctrine does not
extend to groundwater, at least absent some impact on the pulic use of navigable waters.") (citing
Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
76. Stevens, supm note 74 (citing CAL. WATER CODE §1200); N. Gualala Water Co. v.
State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1585-86 (2006). The SWRCB uses a
four-part test to define an underground stream that requires a permit to pump:
1. Is there a subsurface channel?
2. Does the channel have relatively impermeable bed and banks?
3. Is its course known or capable of being known by reasonable inference?
4. Is groundwater flowing in die channel?
77. Discussed supm Section b.
78.

ARTHUR L. LIrLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER

11

71 (2nd ed.

2007).
79. JOSEPH L. SAx, REVIEW OF THE LAWS ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB's PERMITTING
AUTHORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CLASSIFIED AS SUBTERRANEAN
STREAMS AND THE SWRCB's IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS No. 0-076-300-0 at 1 (2002)

("[tlo put the matter as simply as possible, the above categories do not accord with scientific
understanding of the occurrence and distribution of water on and in the [Elarth.") [hereinafter
SAX REVIEW].

80. Id. at 38. ("In short, all the evidence we have indicates that the legislative language was
designed to exclude groundwater generally, except for that which was functionally part and
parcel of a surface stream-in the sense of pumping that directly affected surface flow.").
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The state currently does not regulate overlying users' right to percolating
groundwater-property owners may pump groundwater beneath their land
without a state permit." To be sure, overlying owners of percolating groundwater only have the right to use the water in reasonable and beneficial ways." But
because the state plays no role in regulating groundwater, the task falls to local
agencies and courts to regulate against wasteful use and overdrafting." The
result has been a patchwork of inconsistent rdes that vary among cities, water
districts, and courts."
Unlike overlying owners, the state does recognize appropriative rights for
people who want to pump and export percolating groundwater." If there is
surplus percolating groundwater in a basin, California law allows people to
acquire appropriative rights without state involvement." The state considers the
right perfected once a user takes the surplus water for a non-overlying use."
Technically, senior appropriators have the right to satisfy their full appropriation before junior appropriators can pump, just like with surface water appropriations." However, unlike surface water appropriations, no state permitting
system exists in California to quantify a groundwater appropriation right or the
total amount of water available in a groundwater basin before overdraft occurs." As such, even in an overdrafted basin with no surplus, junior appropriators will often pump their full use anyway.' In fact, where a community relies
on an overdrafted basin, "no case has limited pumpers ... based on claimed
priorities."" Groundwater thus remains largely unregulated and outside the
purview of state agency jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the state of California still holds an interest in all waters of
the state, including groundwater." And California's Constitution authorizes the
Legislature to enact laws to further the reasonable and beneficial use mandate." Some observers argue that despite legislative reluctance to interfere in
groundwater regulation, the courts enforce the public interest in groundwater."
For example, the Audubon court found the SWRCB had jurisdiction over all
water that affects public trust interests, regardless of whether the SWRCB issues permits for that water." So if a groundwater source feeds navigable waters,
the SWRCB may be able to invoke public trust doctrine authority to regulate
8 1. Id.
82. LrrTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 77, at 74.
83. Id.; John Hedges, Currentsin Calornia Water Law:- The Push to Integate Groundwater and Surface Water Management Through the Courts, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 375,
382 (2011).
84. Hedges, supra note 83.
85. LrrfLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 77, at 76.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 77.
90. Id.
91. LrftLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 77, at 77.
92. Stevens, supra note 74, at 3, 34-35.
93. CAL. CONST. art X § 2; Id.
94. Stevens, supra note 72, at 35.
95. Id.
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against unreasonable uses.' Yet, because the SWRCB does not define
groundwater in terms of its connection to other bodies of water (and is not
involved in permitting for percolating groundwater), lawsuits may be the most
practical way to actually limit groundwater pumping."w

III. HOW WIL THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AFFECT
CALIFORNIA?
As of January 1, 2013, California has a new state policy that aims to provide its citizens with safe and affordable drinking water.' The Human Right to
Water statute declares a human right to water in subsection (a)." Of particular
importance, the right extends only to water "adequate for human consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes."" In subsection (b), the statute requires
relevant state agencies to consider the policy when making certain agency decisions pertinent to the policy."' Subsection (c) restricts state obligations to any
obligations that may exist in subsection (b).'" Subsection (d) limits the statute's
application to existing water supplies." Finally, Subsection (e) limits the statute's implementation from "infringling) on the rights or responsibilities of any
public water system.""
Opposition to the Human Right to Water sprouted as the bill, Assembly
Bill 685 ("AB 685"), worked its way through the California State Assembly.
Those who opposed the bill focused on: (i) the ambiguity of a human right to
water, (ii) the fear of increased costs to state and local government due to potential liability, and (iii) the redundancy of a human right to water in a state that
already prioritizes domestic uses." Moments before the bill passed in the California Assembly, assembly member Manuel Perez poignantly remarked,
"What good is a right that still costs you money ... somebody has to pay for
the water.""
The Safe Water Alliance, a prominent supporter of AB 685, published
The Lega Implications of AB 685 ("report") to address concerns that arose
during legislative debate and amendment throughout 2012. The report first
outlined why California needed the new policy. It pointed out that a significant
number of Californians could not drink their tap water and argued that con96.
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tamination and aging infrastructure resulted in unacceptably expensive water."
Next, the report defined the scope of legal obligations AB 685 would confer
on state agencies. Despite the grandiose name of the policy, A Human Right
to Water, AB 685 creates no independently enforceable rights for anyone."
Instead, it merely creates a duty for state agencies, triggered when an agency
engages in an administrative action likely to impact water safety or affordability.' As such, agencies have no independent duty to adopt new policies or
regulations; only when agencies are already involved in an action relevant to
safe and affordable water would AB 685 require them to advance the policy's
pronouncement."'
However, the Legislature amended AB 685 after the report with one substantive change-instead of requiring agencies to "advance the implementation"
of the policy, the current statute only requires agencies to "consider" the policy."' Regardless of the broader agency discretion in merely considering the
policy, the same circumstances trigger the duty-adoption or revision of relevant policies, regulations, or funding criteria.
The amendment undeniably dulled the teeth of the statute. Prior to
amendment, the report optimistically asserted that because of AB 685, "at
every relevant juncture, every relevant agency will be required to take another
step (however small) in the direction of achieving universal access to safe, affordable domestic water service.""' However, the amended statute requires no
such steady march towards safe and affordable water. The current language
conceivably, though improbably, allows hundreds of years to go by with state
agencies considering the safety and affordability of water, yet never implementing the goal of universal access.
Yet, it is exactly that type of discretion that is already the foundation of
California water law. The Audubon court grappled with the same issues the
Human Right to Water faced when the Legislature amended it. At first, the
Human Right to Water would have required the SWRCB to constantly advance implementation of universal access to safe and affordable water. But
those who opposed that "steady march" type of language foresaw a collision
course"'-if universal access always outweighed appropriation interests, "either
doctrine fully applied would exclude the other.""' The amended, current version thus reflects and fits nicely into the balanced Audubon approach whereby
the SWRCB must always considerthe human right to water alongside all other
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water policies and doctrines, including public trust interests and domestic use
pronty.
Indeed, California courts traditionally allowed state agencies wide discretion when carrying out administrative actions that impacted substantive, discretionary state policies."' It is difficult to determine what level of discretion courts
will allow agencies as they carry out actions impacting water safety and affordability. One clue may be the courts' treatment of section 106."' Section 106
prioritizes domestic uses of water above all others, with irrigation use being the
next highest priority." The SafeWater Alliance identified Section 106 as the
closest substantive parallel policy to the Human Right to Water, especially as it
is also binding upon every California agency."' Indeed, courts consistently
point out that California has numerous overlapping policies, all deserving of
state agency consideration." Except for indicating that domestic uses of water
tend to be the most beneficial uses, Section 106 does not identify exactly how
much weight, relative to other competing and complementary policies, state
agencies should give section 106."' Case in point, a domestic use of water from
Mono Lake-critical to the development of California's largest city, Los Angeles-did not categorically trump a public trust use, as seen in Audubon.'" Because the Human Right to Water does not even go as far as Section 106 to
assert that the water used to further its policy is the most beneficial use of water, courts are likely to allow agencies wide latitude when their decisions impact the safety and affordability of water as long as the agency can point to
overriding considerations or policies.
Opponents of AB 685 also had reservations about the bill exposing the
state to potential liability if Californians sued the state because they only had
access to unsafe or unaffordable water." The SafeWater Alliance rejected
those concerns even before the Legislature amended AB 685, when it still
required the state to advance the policy instead of only consider it. The
SafeWater Alliance's report argued that the bill created no new right and the
only enforcement possible, if any, was injunctive relief if the SWRCB, for ex-
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ample, failed to advance universal access to safe and affordable water." With
the current language only requiring the SWRCB to consider the Human Right
to Water, it seems unlikely that a court would grant an injunction. Additionally, subsections (c)-(d) of the Human Right to Water expressly limit or exempt
state liability.'" Nonetheless, California state agencies may continue to eye the
Human Right to Water with trepidation if they will have to spend resources
fighting legal battles that they ultimately expect to win.
Furthermore, SafeWater Alliance's report noted the bill would leave untouched the quantitative standard of safety for drinking water. The Human
Right to Water lays out a duty for state agencies to ensure quaitativestandards
of "safe" and "affordable" drinking water for California residents. However,
California already uses quantitativestandards to determine drinking water safety.'" Additionally, the Safe Drinking Water Act requires the United States Department of Health Services, in adopting the quantitative drinking water standards, to consider not only state public health goals and Environmental Protection Agency standards for each contaminant, but also to predict costs of compliance.'" In other words, in setting enforceable quantitative drinking water
standards, federal and state laws already require relevant state agencies to consider both safety and affordability.'"
Moreover, California courts have expressly rejected policy pronouncements of water quality like "pure, wholesome, and potable" as enforceable
standards when a quantitative standard already defines the water quality standard with a numeric value.' In In Re GroundwaterCases, the court held that a
party may not bring an action against defendants complying with state numerical standards." The court reasoned that "[plermitting courts and juries to second-guess the carefully considered decisions of the regulatory agencies on
technical water quality issues would. flout the Legislature's policy choice to entrust such matters to [regulatory agencies.]""'
Given the relaxed requirement that state agencies merely consider the universal access policy found in the Human Right to Water, courts are even less
likely to force state agencies to pay out damages or issue injunctions than the
SafeWater Alliance predicted. Moreover, the state already must consider domestic use supremacy and the public trust doctrine, and these considerations
heavily overlap with the safety and affordability considerations mandated in the
Human Right to Water. Thus, California state agencies would have to disregard not only the Human Right to Water, but several duties they already have
to open themselves up to liability. On the other hand, opponents point out that
although the Human Right to Water exempts local agencies from liability, it
124.
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does not exempt them from lawsuits.'" These local agencies cannot afford the
uncertainty this legislation creates.'" State agencies, too, are not only concerned
with paying monetary damages; additional litigation and possible compliance
with injunctive court orders could impact state and local budgets in the future,
though likely to a relatively modest extent.
In sum, the new policy will likely not have the costly effects some opponents fear. And although ambiguous, the policy reflects and adds to the underlying foundation of California water law by providing exactly the type of agency
discretion California has promoted since statehood." Finally, although water
safety and affordability considerations inhere in many of California's existing
laws, policies, regulations, and its constitution, the Human Right to Water
policy can still orient agency action towards addressing the serious, internationally-condemned water availability problems."
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT' ON GROUNDWATER
Even though the Human Right to Water does not directly implicate
groundwater because groundwater is outside state agency jurisdiction, the new
statute may indicate a legislative wilingness to expand state agency jurisdiction.
Today, groundwater accounts for thirty percent of California's water supply in
non-drought years." For the central coast, it accounted for eighty-three percent
of the general supply in 2003." Municipal water system operators (like cities
and water districts) own many appropriation rights to percolating groundwater-in fact, many California cities rely mainly on groundwater sources." Half
of California residents rely on groundwater for one-fourth of their drinking
water." Unfortunately, however, some of these groundwater sources contain
high levels of contaminants due to pollution from industrial and agricultural
runoff."
The San Joaquin Valley exemplifies the groundwater safety and affordability problems in California. Residents in the San Joaquin Valley rely on
groundwater for ninety percent of their drinking water."' Proponents of the
Human Right to Water specifically pointed to the communities in San Joaquin
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as communities that would benefit from a Human Right to Water."' " However, in the absence of state regulatory authority, the Human Right to Water will
not require anyone to consider the impact of pumping or overdrafting on
many California communities, such as the San Joaquin Valley community, that
rely on groundwater for drinking water.'" Given the legislative debate's focus
on groundwater-reliant communities, perhaps AB 685's drafters intended that
to change.
Quite possibly the Human Right to Water was actually passed to push the
SWRCB to start regulating groundwater-or at least to redefine subterranean
streams (which they already regulate directly) in a way that takes greater notice
of streams' relationship to surface water and navigable bodies of water. Because existing state policies already conform with the goals in the bill, the
seemingly redundant statute may aim to spur state agencies and courts to recognize a more realistic model of groundwater regulation and its relationship to
surface water. Indeed, the statute's language directs state agencies to consider
the human right to water when adoptingnew regulations and revisingold regulations." Of course, many scholars have long pondered the wisdom of broader
statewide regulatory authority:
But this State has a long and deep history of resistance to such integration,
and the prospects of achieving legislative change that wouldn't be piecemeal
or nddled with destructive exceptions seems very dim within the foreseeable
future. In addition, California's exception of riparian uses (which cases indicate includes overlying applications of groundwater) from its permitting system provides another reason to doubt the prospects of full integration of
[groundwaterl administration under a Board ISWRCB] pernitting system."
By admitting that groundwater is directly connected to bodies of water
protected by the public trust and the existing state permitting scheme, the
SWRCB could regulate overdrafting and contamination through comprehensive planning and allocation efforts. However, future state-level involvement
would open the state up to considerable liability. Litigating groundwater appropriation pionities alone-never before attempted"'-would be immensely
expensive. More broadly speaking, if the Legislature forces the SWRCB to reevaluate groundwater pumping throughout the state, it "would lead to waterrights chaos . . . ."' State agency fears of groundwater integration are well-
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V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, California now has a legislative pronouncement that the state
wishes to secure safe and affordable water for all its residents. However, the
state has a long way to go before it reaches an adequate level of access to clean
water." Although increasing access to water for domestic uses is already the
state's priority, it is not the state's reality. Yet, no matter how ambiguous the
state's duty, or redundant the policy, requiring an additional level of safety and
affordability consideration may well persuade an agency to give greater weight
to domestic uses and apply the policy to more situations than previously. Most
concerning for agencies, the new statute may be the first step towards integrating groundwater into the state's regulatory system. Certainly, groundwater
management is an important goal for a state with such limited water resources,
but state agencies have much to fear from the inevitable cascade of litigation
that would result. Time will tell whether the Human Right to Water is an indicator of legislative willingness to fight a battle for control of groundwater. Given the egregious water safety and affordability conditions in many California
communities, something needs to change.
With the Human Right to Water, California has added what sounds like a
revolutionary cookie to its rather complicated policy jar. But the new policy
simply reaffirms the existing framework of appropriations, while leaving
groundwater pumping virtually untouched (at least for now). Looking to the
future, it is hard to see how the Human Right to Water will either upend California water law or drastically increase state administration costs. But perhaps
this new law is the first step of many that will aim to mend California's notorious scarce-resource distribution inequities. Standing alone, however, the Human Right to Water simply sounds unusual; in reality, it simply builds on the
current staples of California water law legislation-agency discretion and public
trust flexibility.
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